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Chapter 6 
Wage Inequality 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to consider wage inequality in India at a point in time (2001-
2012) with particular reference to inequality in wages between male and female workers and between 
workers from different social groups – the Scheduled Tribes (ST), the Scheduled Cates (SC), the non-
Muslim Other Backward Classes (OBC-NM), Muslims, and the Forward Castes (FC).1 The thrust of 
the analysis in this chapter is to decompose the difference in wages between men and women, and 
between the FC and the other social groups, into a part that can be “explained” by employer bias and 
that which is due to differences in employee attributes.2   
 A precursor to the work reported in this paper is that of Das (2012) who examined wage 
inequality in India using National Sample Survey data for the 61st round (2004-05). Using the Gini 
Index to decompose inequality, Das (2012) examined the within and between group contributions to 
inequality by sector (public, private, and informal), by location (rural, urban), by employment type 
(casual, regular), and by gender. In a similar vein, Glinskaya and Lokshin (2005), using the National 
Sample Surveys for 1993-94 and 1999-2000, investigated wage differentials between the public and 
private sectors while Galbraith et. al. (2004), using, principally, Annual Survey of Industries data, 
examined pay inequality in India’s manufacturing sector for 1997-98.  In operational terms, this 
chapter extends these earlier analyses to include social groups, and methodologically, unlike, these 
studies, it seeks an explanation for inter-group inequality in terms of employer bias and (differences 
in) employee attributes.      
6.2 Wages in India 
 The data for this chapter’s analysis of wages in India were obtained from two separate and 
independent sources: the 68th round of the National Sample Survey (hereafter, NSS 68th round) 
pertaining to the period July 2011-June 2012 and the Indian Human Development Survey for 2011 
(hereafter, IHDS-11). The NSS provided details of a person’s current weekly status in terms of 
 
1
 Where the latter include Christians, Sikhs, and Jains who are not from the ST/SC/OBC-NM. 
2
 This chapter does not address the issue of the evolution of wage inequality over time, a topic which has been 
extensively discussed by Dutta (2005), Chamarwagwala (2006), Kijima (2006), Mazumdar et. al. (2017a and 
2017b), Mazumdar and Sarkar (2008), Sarkar and Mehta (2010). 
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whether in the course of a reference week he/she was in Regular Salaried or Wage Employment 
(RSWE); in casual wage employment (CWE); an own account worker (OAW); or unemployed (UE). 
The NSS also reported on the intensity with which an employed person worked on each day of the 
reference week where this intensity referred to whether he/she worked a full day (value 1) or a half 
day (value 0.5). The maximum and minimum number of (full) days an employed person could work 
in a week was, therefore, 7 and 0.5, respectively.3 The NSS also reported on the total wages received 
by every person who was employed during that week; dividing total wages by the number of full days 
worked – that is total number of days worked in the reference week, adjusted for intensity - then 
yielded the daily wage rate. This daily wage rate is analysed in this chapter under the aegis of the 
NSS. 
 The IHDS-11, in its section on wage and salary data, provided information for employed 
persons on their payment period (daily, monthly, or fixed) and also the cash they received during the 
payment period. From these data, the monthly wage of each person was computed as follows: for 
those whose payment period was daily, the monthly wage was their reported cash/period multiplied 
by 30; for those whose payment period was monthly, the monthly wage was their reported 
cash/period; for those who received a fixed payment, their monthly wage was their reported 
cash/period divided by the number of days they worked (to obtain their daily wage) multiplied by 30.4  
<Tables 6.1 and 6.2> 
 Table 6.1 shows the average daily wage, while Table 6.2 shows the average monthly wage, 
for persons, between the ages of 21 and 60 (hereafter, simply “persons”), distinguished by gender and 
by the five social groups: Scheduled Tribes (ST); Scheduled Castes (ST); non-Muslim Other 
Backward Classes (OBC-NM); Muslims; and Forward Castes (FC).  The first feature of note in Table 
6.1 is that the average daily wage of women over all occupations, at ₹177, was only 57% of the male 
daily wage of ₹309.  The second feature of note in Table 6.1 is that the average daily wage, over all 
occupations, of persons from the ST, SC, OBC-NM, and of Muslims at, respectively, ₹187, ₹200, 
₹244, and ₹221 was less than half the average daily wage of ₹484 obtained by persons from the FC. 
 
3
 By definition, an unemployed person did not work on any day of the week. 
4
 I am grateful to Ajaya Kumar Naik for advice on calculating wage rates from NSS and IHDS-11 data. 
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 These findings are echoed by the calculations of the monthly wage rate from IHDS-11data 
where these data, it should be reiterated, are separate and independent of those from the NSS.  Table 
6.2 shows that average monthly wage of women over all occupations, at ₹3,531, was only 54% of the 
male daily wage of ₹6,518 and, further, that the average monthly wage, over all occupations, of 
persons from the ST, SC, OBC-NM, and of Muslims at, respectively, ₹3,814, ₹4,773, ₹5,323, and 
₹5,294 was 60% or less of the average monthly wage of ₹8,896 obtained by persons from the FC. 
 In terms of occupations, Table 6.1 shows that the spread of daily wages was much greater in 
the RSWE occupation than among CWE or OAW: for those in RSWE, the ratio of the largest average 
daily wage of ₹628, obtained by persons from the FC, to the lowest daily wage of ₹341 for Muslims, 
was 1.84 while, for those in CWE, the ratio of the largest average daily wage of ₹151, obtained by 
Muslims, to the lowest daily wage of ₹114, received by persons from the SC, was 1.32. However, this 
did not apply to the ratio of male to female wages: this ratio was 1.51 for those in RSWE and in CWE.  
 Table 6.2 shows that the ratio of the highest to the lowest monthly wage in the P&E 
occupations – respectively, ₹17,216 for the FC and ₹11,894 for the ST – was 1.44 while the ratio of 
male to female wages in the P&E occupations – at, respectively, ₹17,227 and ₹10,210 – was 1.68.  In 
terms of the monthly wage, the smallest high-to-low ratios were recorded for construction: ratio of the 
monthly wages of ₹4,461 and ₹3,625, obtained by, respectively, persons from the FC and the ST was 
1.23 while the male-female monthly wage ratio in construction was 1.38. 
One of the most popular ways of measuring inequality is by the Gini coefficient which is 
computed as follows. If N is the number of persons, wi is the wage of person i and w is the mean 
wage, computed over the N persons, the Gini coefficient is defined as: 
 2
1 1
1 | w |
2
N N
i j
i j
G w
N w = =
= −   (6.1) 
 In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in wages 
between pairs of respondents, divided by the average wage ( w ).  One can also, from the Gini 
coefficient compute a measure of welfare (W) due to Sen (1976).  The idea behind this measure, 
represented by (1 )W w G= − , is that welfare rises with increases in the average wage, w , but falls as 
inequality in the distribution of wages rises. There is thus a trade-off between the welfare-enhancing 
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property of the average wage and the welfare-diminishing property of inequality in the wage 
distribution and it is this trade-off that Sen’s (1976) welfare measure seeks to capture. 
<Tables 6.3 and 6.4> 
 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the Gini and the welfare values for, respectively, the distributions of 
the daily (derived from the NSS) and monthly (derived from the IHDS-11) wages. Computed over all 
persons, the Gini values were 0.498 and 0.424 for, respectively, daily and monthly wages. In order to 
place this context, the World Bank reported that for 2011 the Gini value associated with the 
distribution of incomes in India was 0.352 and this was lower than that the USA’s 0.41 and China’s 
0.422.  Needless to say, wage inequality might be expected to be higher than income inequality not 
least because the former excludes, but the latter includes, the equalising effect of government social 
welfare transfers. 
 Also shown In Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are the Gini values associated with the different 
occupational categories and the different subgroups of the population. In terms of the distribution of 
the NSS’s daily wage, the highest level of inequality was associated with RSWE (Table 6.3: 
Gini=0.477) with both CWE and OAW displaying much more compressed distributions with 
associated Gini values of respectively, 0.267 and 0.260.This finding was echoed in Table 6.4: the 
highest level of inequality in the distribution of the IHDS-11’s monthly wage was associated with 
P&E and sales/service occupations (Table 6.4: Gini=0.466 and 0.49, respectively) in contrast to the 
Gini values of 0.262 and 0.234 for, respectively, agricultural labour and construction.  This meant that 
the difference in welfare levels between those in RSWE (Table 6.3: ₹247) and those in CWE and 
OAW (₹106 and ₹105, respectively) was smaller than differences in average daily wages (Table 6.1: 
₹472, ₹144, and ₹143 for, respectively, RSWE, CWE, and OAW).  Similarly, the difference in 
welfare levels between those in P&E jobs (Table 6.4: ₹8,047) and those that were agricultural 
labourers or worked in construction (₹2,559 and ₹3,175, respectively) was smaller than differences in 
average monthly wages (Table 6.2: ₹15,075, ₹3,471, and ₹4,144 for, respectively, P&E, agriculture, 
and construction).      
 In terms of the social groups, inequality (measured over all persons), with respect to both 
daily and monthly wages, was highest within the FC (Table: 6.3: Gini=0.528 and Table 6.4: 
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Gini=0.485) and, for the daily wage, lowest within the SC (Table 6.3: Gini=0.406) and, for the 
monthly wage, lowest within the ST (Table 6.4: Gini=0.333).  The overall level of inequality, for 
daily wages, was fairly similar for men and women (Table 6.3: respectively, 0.481 and 0.487) though, 
underlying this, was a greater degree of inequality in RSWE for women than for men (Table 6.3: 
respectively, 0.559 and 0.454) compensated for by a lower degree of inequality for women than for 
men in CWE and OAW (Table 6.3: respectively, 0.218 and 0.257 for CWE and 0.183 and 0.261 for 
OAW).  In respect of money wages, the overall level of inequality was lower for men than for women 
(Table 6.4: respectively, 0.412 and 0.357) though, underlying this, was a greater degree of inequality 
in P&E jobs for women than for men (Table 6.4: respectively, 0.524 and 0.429) balanced by a lower 
degree of inequality for women than for men in agriculture and construction (Table 6.4: respectively, 
0.206 and 0.259 for agriculture and 0.153 and 0.247 for construction). 
6.3 The Decomposition of Wage Inequality     
 The analysis of wage inequality in the previous section, encapsulated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, 
highlighted three factors which affected a person’s daily (NSS), or monthly (IHDS-11), wage: social 
group; gender; and occupation. This section examines, using the tools of inequality decomposition, 
the relative contribution of these three factors to inter-personal inequality in wages. 
The method of inequality decomposition divides overall inequality into two parts: ‘between-
group’ and ‘within-group’ part inequality.  When the decomposition is additive, overall inequality can 
be written as the sum of within group and between group inequality: 
 
overall ineqality within group inequality between group inequality
I A B= +   (6.2) 
 When inequality is additively decomposed then one can say that the basis on which the 
individuals were subdivided (say, gender) contributed [(B/I)100] percent to overall inequality, the 
remaining inequality, [(A/I)100] percent, being due to inequality within the subgroups of men and 
women.  So, inequality decomposition provides a way of analysing the extent to which inter-personal 
inequality (in this case, in wages) is ‘explained’ by a factor or a set of factors.  If, indeed, inequality 
can be ‘additively decomposed’ then, as Cowell and Jenkins (1995) have shown, the proportionate 
contribution of the between-group component (B) to overall inequality is the income inequality 
6 
 
literature’s analogue of the R2 statistic used in regression analysis: the size of this contribution is a 
measure of the amount of inequality that can be ‘explained’ by the factor (or factors) used to 
subdivide the sample. 
 Only inequality indices belonging to the family of Generalised Entropy Indices are additively 
decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980).  These indices are defined by a parameter  and, when =0, the 
weights are the population shares of the different groups (that is, /j jN N = );  since the weights 
sum to unity, the within-group contribution A of equation (6.2) is a weighted average of the inequality 
levels within the groups.  When =0, the inequality index takes the form:  
 
1
( ; ) log( / ) /
N
i
i
I N w w N
=
 =   w  (6.3) 
where: 
1
/
N
i
i
w w N
=
=  is the mean wage over the entire sample.  The inequality index defined in 
equation (6.3) is known as the Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) and, because of its 
attractive features in terms of the interpretation of the weights, it was the one used in this chapter  to 
decompose wage inequality. 
<Table 6.5> 
 Table 6.5 shows the contributions that each of these factors made to overall inequality in daily 
and in monthly wages.  The contribution of between group inequality to overall inequality in daily 
wages was 6.3%, 14.9%, and 41.7% when the division of the sample was by, respectively, gender, 
social group, and employment status.  So, again using the language of Cowell and Jenkins (1995), 
63% of overall inequality in daily wages could be “explained” by a collective of these three factors 
with employment status “explaining” 42%.  Table 6.5 also shows that the contribution of between 
group inequality to overall inequality in monthly wages was 12.4%, 9.8%, and 35.8% when the 
division of the sample was by, respectively, gender, social group, and occupation.  So, using the 
language of Cowell and Jenkins (1995), 58% of overall inequality in monthly wages could be 
“explained” by a collective of these three factors with employment status “explaining” 36%.           
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6.4. The Equally Distributed Equivalent Wage 
 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 showed, respectively, the average daily and monthly wages of persons of 
21-60 years of age disaggregated by gender, by social group, and by employment status (NSS) and 
occupation (IHDS-11). Focusing exclusively on a group’s mean income, and ignoring inequality in 
the distribution of these incomes between members of the group’s, however, risks overstating its 
income achievement. Suppose that X is the mean wage of N persons indexed (i=1…N), belonging to a 
particular group. We know that, because of wage inequality, not every person in the group receives 
the average wage. Therefore, in assessing the “wage achievement” of a group one must know by how 
much one should reduce its mean wage to take account of inequality in individual wages.   
 In his seminal paper on income inequality, Atkinson (1970) argued that society would be 
prepared to accept a reduction in average income, from a higher average income which was unequally 
distributed, provided the lower income was equally distributed.5  Consequently, one could reduce the 
mean wage, X , of a group by the amount  of intra-group inequality in wages to arrive at eX , the 
“equally distributed equivalent” (EDE) wage where eX X .  The EDE wage, eX  - as the wage of 
every person within that group (that is, equally distributed between the group’s members) - would 
give the same level of welfare as the (unequally distributed) X or, in other words, would be “welfare 
equivalent” to X . 
 The size of this reduction depended upon one’s degree of "inequality aversion" which 
Atkinson (1970) measured by the value of a (inequality aversion) parameter, 0  .  When 0 = , 
there was no inequality aversion implying that one would not be prepared to accept any reduction in 
average income in order to secure a more equitable distribution. The degree of inequality aversion 
increased with the value of : the higher the value of , the greater one’s aversion to inequality and 
the greater the reduction in average income that one would find acceptable in order to secure an 
equitable distribution of income. 
 
5
 In the language of economics, the two situations would yield the same level of social welfare, that is, be 
'welfare equivalent'. 
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Three special cases, contingent upon the value assumed by , may be distinguished (Anand 
and Sen, 1997): 
1. When 0 =  (no inequality aversion), eX  is the arithmetic mean of the individual wages 
in the group: eX X=   
2. When 1 = , eX  is the geometric mean of the individual wages in the group: 
( )
1/
1
 < 
NN
Ne
i
i
X X X
=
 =      
3. When 2 = , eX is the harmonic  mean of the individual wages in the group: 
1
1
 
N
e
i i
X N X
X=
=   
A Diagrammatic Analysis 
 It may be useful to present the analysis of the preceding paragraphs in diagrammatic terms. 
Figure 6.1 portrays a world of two persons (R and S) who are required to ‘share’ a given mean wage, 
W  , in terms of their individual wages, WR and WS.  The horizontal axis of Figure 6.1 measures WR 
and the vertical axis measures WS.  The two wages are related to the aggregate wage by the ‘sharing’ 
equation: ( ) / 2R SW W W= +  and this is represented in Figure 6.1 by the ‘sharing possibility line’, MN. 
The point X, on MN, lies on the 450 line passing through the origin and, so, X is the point at which
R SW W= .  
<Figure 6.1> 
 Given the mean wage,W , the observed distributional outcome may be viewed as a mapping 
of W to a point on MN which establishes WR and WS. Different outcomes will locate at different 
points of MN. Those that locate closer to the point X (for example, B) will be more egalitarian than 
those (like A) which locate further away. 
 If every person is assigned the same concave utility function U(.), then ( )iU W is the utility 
that person i (i=R,S) obtains from a wage of iW and ‘social welfare’, denoted by Q, is defined as the 
sum of the utilities of all the children: 
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 ( ) ( )R SQ U W U W= +   (6.4) 
 The curves QQ and Q Q represent indifference curves associated with the welfare function 
of equation (6.4), the higher curve (QQ) representing a higher level of utility than the lower curve (Q 
Q) and these welfare indifference curves are superimposed upon the sharing possibility line.6   Since 
the utility functions (.)U  in equation (6.4) are assumed to be concave (that is, embodying the property 
of diminishing marginal utility), social welfare is maximised when R SW W=  that is, when both 
receive the same wage.7  Consequently, X is the point at which welfare is maximised and is the point 
at which the indifference curve, QQ, is tangential to the sharing possibility line, MN. The distribution, 
however, delivers an outcome at point A at which person R receives a higher wage ( RW OF=  ) and 
person S a lower score ( SW AF= ).   The outcome at point A is welfare equivalent to that at point C at 
which both persons receive the same score ( R SW W CD= = ). CD is then defined as the equally 
distributed equivalent (EDE) wage  
<Figure 6.2> 
 The value of the inequality aversion parameter,  determines the curvature of the indifference 
curves. The larger the value of , the more ‘bow-shaped’ will be the indifference curve and the 
smaller the value of , the flatter will be the indifference curve. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2 in 
which QQ and WW represent, respectively, indifference curves associated with a low and a high 
value of.  Both curves pass through the point A on the shares possibility line MN but CD, the EDE 
wage associated with QQ (low), is greater than CD, the EDE wage associated with QQ (high ). 
<Table 6.6> 
 Table 6.6 shows the EDE daily and monthly wage for different levels of inequality aversion 
as defined by the inequality aversion parameter, ε. When ε=0, there is no inequality aversion and the 
average wage (as shown in the columns of Table 6.1 and 6.2) is the same as the EDE wage.  Persons 
 
6
 An indifference curve shows the different combinations of ,R SW W  which yield the same level of welfare. It is 
obtained by holding Q constant in equation (6.4) and solving for the different ,R SW W which yield this value of 
Q. 
7
 Because of concavity, an egalitarian transfer from R to S will increase welfare: the gain in utility to S will 
exceed the loss to R. Welfare will be maximised when no further net gain is possible that is, when R SW W=  . 
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who have no aversion to inequality (that is, those for whom ε=0) do not see any loss of social welfare 
resulting from inequality in the distribution of wages: for them all that matters is the average (that is, 
arithmetic mean) wage.  
 For persons with “mild” inequality aversion (ε=1), the geometric mean of wages, if equally 
distributed among all wage earners, would give the same level of welfare as the arithmetic mean, 
unequally distributed as in the sample.  Table 6.6 shows that such persons would countenance a 
reduction in average wages from ₹276 to ₹182, a reduction of 34%, provided the ₹182 was equally 
distributed.  For persons with “strong” inequality aversion (ε=2), the harmonic mean of wages, if 
equally distributed among all wage earners, would give the same level of welfare as the distribution 
which yields the arithmetic mean of the sample.  Table 6.6 shows that such persons would 
countenance a reduction in average wages from ₹276 to ₹136, a reduction of 51%, provided the ₹136 
was equally distributed. 
 A similar story emerges with respect to monthly wages. Mild inequality aversion, with ε=1,  
yields a EDE monthly wage of ₹4,077 which is 26% below the arithmetic mean of ₹5,539 while 
strong inequality aversion, with ε=2, yields a EDE monthly wage of ₹3,045 which is 45% below the 
arithmetic mean of ₹5,339. The thrust of this analysis is that in assessing a country’s achievements 
with regard to wages, account needs to be taken of the average level of wages and also inequality in 
these wages between groups and between persons. These “equity-sensitive’ wages measure, using the 
language of Sen (1993), the effectiveness with which different groups and persons function in the 
labour market and they draw attention to the importance of raising the capabilities of vulnerable 
groups and persons to function more effectively. In consequence, instead of ignoring issues about 
inequality, the use of equity-sensitive wages opens up a policy debate about the amount of inequality 
that is acceptable in a particular society.   
6.5 Gender Disparity and Discrimination in Monthly Wages 
 The disparity in wages between men and women raises the vexed question of the sources of 
such disparity. Do women receive lower wages than men because of employer bias – in other words, 
are women penalised simply because they are women?  Or is it the case that, in terms of employment, 
women have less favourable attributes than men and that their lower wages are due to a paucity of 
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employee attributes?  Or, as is more likely, is wage disparity driven by both employer bias and 
employee attributes in which case it is important to estimate the shares of bias and attributes in 
determining overall disparity. 
 The first step towards answering this question lay in using IHDS-11 data to estimate a 
regression equation in which the monthly wages of persons (aged 21-60 years) was the dependent 
variable to be explained by several independent variables:  
1. Social group: ST, SC, OBC-NM, Muslim, FC.  
2. Education: none, up to primary, above primary and up to secondary, higher secondary; 
graduate and above.  
3. Fluency in English: none, little fluency, fluent. 
4. Location: metropolitan, non-metropolitan urban, developed village, less developed village. 
5. The nature of the employment contract: casual, less than 1 year’s tenure, permanent. 
6. Employer: public sector, private employer, private firm, NREGA, other employer. 
7. Occupation: professional and executive, clerical, sales/service, agricultural labour, 
construction, other non-farm. 
8. Age band: 21-30 years, 31-40 years, 41-50 years, 51-60 years. 
9. The state in which the person lived. 
The innovation about the wage equation, outlined above, was that each of the variables 1-9, 
above, was interacted with a gender variable which took the value 0 if the person was male and the 
value 1 if the person was female. In order to appreciate the difference between an ‘interacted’ and a 
‘non-interacted’ equation consider the following equation for the wage wi which is explained by two 
explanatory variables X (education) and Z (gender), for observations indexed i=1…N, without and 
with interaction between X and Z. 
 ( )
i i i
i i i i i
w X Z
w X Z X Z
  
   
= + +
= + + +    (6.5) 
  In the first equation, the effects of social group and gender on wages are independent of each 
other: the effect of social group is the same (β) regardless of whether the person is male or female. In 
the second, interacted equation, the effect of social group is different between men and women: β for 
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men and β+ϕ for women. Consequently, the interacted equation allows, for every group, the predicted 
wage for men and women from that group to be different and, furthermore, it allows one to test 
whether this difference was significantly different from zero. 
Using the methodology developed in earlier chapters, a major purpose of this chapter was to 
disentangle the effects of employer bias and employee attributes on the observed wages of men and 
women.  These observed wages are referred to as the average predicted wages because if the 
regression model was used to predict the wage for each of the N persons in the sample (denoted
ˆ , 1...iw i N= ) then the average of these ˆ iw , computed over the subsamples of men and of women, 
would equal the observed wage of men and women. This is because the regression model has the 
property of passing through the mean.  So, ˆ ˆ and M Fw w , the average predicted wage from the 
regression model of, respectively, men and women would be the same as the observed wage of men 
and women. In contrast to the average wages of men and women are average synthetic wages of men 
and women, denoted, respectively,  and M Fw w , where these synthetic wages were computed on the 
basis of simulations based on the method of recycled proportions (described also in previous 
chapters) summarised below.   
In order to compute the synthetic wages of men, it was assumed that all the N persons in the 
estimation sample were men or, in other words, the male coefficient (β in equation (6.5)) were applied 
to every person in the sample to predict that person’s wage, Miw . Then holding the values of the other 
variables constant (either to their observed sample values, as in this chapter, or to their mean values 
over the estimation sample), the average of the Miw  over the N persons was computed and denoted
Mw .  Next, to compute the synthetic wages of women, it was assumed that all the N persons in the 
estimation sample were women or, in other words, the female coefficient (β+ϕ in equation (6.5)) was 
applied to every person in the sample to predict that person’s wage, Fiw . Then holding the values of 
the other variables constant (either to their observed sample values, as in this chapter, or to their mean 
values over the estimation sample), the average of the Fiw  over the N persons was computed and 
denoted Fw . 
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Since the values of the non-gender variables (social group, education, fluency in English, 
location, employer type, age, and state of residence) were unchanged between these two (all-men and 
all-women) scenarios, the only difference between the two synthetic wages, Mw and Fw , was that the 
first wage was the result of applying the male coefficients, while the second wage was the result of 
applying the female coefficients, to the entire sample.  Consequently, the difference between the two 
synthetic wages, Mw and Fw , was entirely due to a difference in gender because all other differences 
between the men and women in the sample had been neutralised by assigning them the attributes of 
the entire sample.   
In essence, therefore, in evaluating the effect of two characteristics X and Y on a particular 
outcome, the method of “recycled proportions” compares two outcomes: first, under an “all have the 
characteristic X” scenario and, then, under an “all have the characteristic Y” scenario, with the values 
of the other variables unchanged between the scenarios. The difference between the two synthetic 
outcomes is then entirely due to the effect of the different attributes represented by X and Y (in this 
case, gender).8 
<Table 6.7> 
 Table 6.7 shows the results from estimating the wage equation, with gender interaction 
effects, on data for 54,702 persons from the IHDS-11 who were between the ages of 21 and 60 years. 
Following the advice of Long and Freese (2013), the results are presented in terms of the synthetic 
wages for men and women for the different variable categories.  The synthetic wages for men and 
women, across all persons, were Mw =  ₹5,864 and Fw = ₹3,923, respectively. It should be 
emphasised that these wages were obtained by applying male and female coefficients, respectively, to 
the entire sample and that they were different from the male and female wages observed in the 
estimation sample, of, respectively, ˆ Mw =  ₹6,110 and ˆ Fw = ₹3,517.9  The difference in the male 
female synthetic wage was ₹1,941and dividing this difference by the standard error of 56 yielded a t-
value of 34.4 which, in turn, meant that this difference was significantly different from zero. In other 
 
8
 STATA’s margin command performs these calculations. See Long and Freese (2013). 
9
 The latter were obtained by computing the average wage after applying, respectively, the male coefficients to 
the male subsample and the female coefficients to the female subsample  
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words, employer bias ensured that women, on average, were paid a monthly wage which was ₹1,941 
less than that of men. 
 The results from Table 6.7 showed that female monthly wages were significantly lower than 
of men for every category of the independent variables. For every level of education (for example, 
graduate women were paid ₹1,089 per month less than graduate men) and every type of job contract 
(for example, women with permanent jobs received ₹2,229 less than their male counterparts) women 
received a lower wage than men. For every employer, occupation, and location women, on average, 
were paid significantly less than men.  Women in every social group, and in every age band, received 
a significantly lower monthly wage than their male counterparts.  And all these differences were the 
result of employer bias: women were penalised for simply being women.            
Quantifying Gender Discrimination in Wages    
 The observed monthly wage of men and women in the estimation sample (remembering that 
the estimation sample was restricted to 54,702 persons between ages of 21 and 60 years of age) were, 
respectively, ₹6,110 and ₹3,517 yielding a difference ˆ ˆM Fw w− =₹2,593. This observed difference in 
wages between men and women was the outcome of two forces: (i) employer bias against women 
which resulted in the (unjustifiably) unequal treatment of equals; (ii) differences between men and 
women in employee attributes which resulted in the (arguably, justifiable) unequal treatment of 
unequals.   
 The synthetic wages for men and women, respectively,  and M Fw w  were obtained by 
keeping, for every person, the value of each of their attribute variables unchanged, except for a 
change to gender. Differences in the average synthetic wage between men and women, M Fw w− , 
were, therefore, entirely the outcome of gender differences and, therefore, could be regarded as the 
outcome of employer bias against women.   
 Consistent with the decomposition methodology set out in detail in the previous chapters, the 
observed difference in male and female wages can be decomposed as: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
CZ A B
M F M F M M F Fw w w w w w w w
  − = − + − − −  
  (6.6) 
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 The terms Z and A in equation (6.6) represent the difference between men and women in 
their, respectively, observed average monthly wage (Z) (in the following discussion, it is assumed that 
ˆ ˆM Fw w that is, the term Z>0) and in their synthetic wage (A) where, as discussed earlier, the term A 
represents the difference which is due solely to differences in gender (so that it would be legitimate to 
regard it as resulting from discrimination against women resulting from employer bias).10  The term 
Z A− represents the amount of the overall wage difference between men and women that is due to 
discrimination. 
 The terms B and C in equation (6.6) could be positive or negative. If say, B>0, then ˆ M Mw w
and the observed male wage is greater than the wage which would result if male coefficients were 
applied to the collective of men and women. This implies that men had “wage determining attributes” 
which were superior to the collective level of attributes.  On the other hand, B<0, would imply that 
men had “wage determining attributes” which were inferior to the collective level of attributes. 
 Similarly if, say, C>0, then ˆ F Fw w and the observed female wage is greater than the wage 
which would result if female coefficients were applied to the collective of men and women. This 
implies that women had “wage determining attributes” which were superior to the collective level of 
attributes.  On the other hand, C<0, would imply that women had “wage-determining” attributes 
which were inferior to the collective level of attributes.  
 If, in equation (6.6), the term (B-C)>0 then it adds to the discriminatory wage gap A so that 
the observed wage gap exceeds the discriminatory wage gap: Z-A>0.  On the other hand, the 
discriminatory wage gap, A, is reduced if (B-C)< 0 and, in consequence, Z-A<0.  The term B-C can be 
interpreted, therefore, as representing the amount of the overall wage difference between men and 
women that is due to a difference in attributes.  In this context, there are two main possibilities: 
1. A>0 and (B-C)>0. In this situation, Z>0 partly because of discrimination (A>0) and partly 
because of the relative superiority of male over female attributes (B-C>0): this implies, Z>A. 
If /A Z = and ( ) /B C Z = −  measure the proportions of the observed wage gap between 
 
10
 See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this decomposition. 
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men and women that is due, respectively, to employer bias and employee attributes, then 
0<<1 and 0<λ<1. 
2.  A>0 and (B-C)<0. In this situation, Z>0 – the observed male wage exceeds that of females - 
in spite of the relative inferiority of male to female (wage-determining) attributes because the 
effect of employer bias exceeds that of employee attributes. In this situation, A>Z so that >1.  
<Table 6.8> 
 It is worth emphasising the differences between the decomposition method set out above and 
the standard decomposition via a wage regression due to Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).  The 
latter decompose the observed difference in average wage between two groups into an “explained” 
and an “unexplained” part. The “explained” part has to do with differences in attributes between the 
two groups and the “unexplained” part is often identified as being due to bias.  In the above 
decomposition, too, the observed difference in average wage between two groups is split into a part 
due to employer bias and another part due to employee attribute differences. However, now, the 
explained part (that is, derived from the regression equation) has to do with bias and the unexplained 
part has to do with attribute differences. 
 Table 6.8 shows the results of quantifying the components of equation (6.6). Of the observed 
wage gap of ₹2,593 in monthly wages between men and women, considered in their entirety, ₹1941 
(or, 75%) could be explained by employer bias while the remainder, ₹652, was due to differences in 
male female attributes. In terms of the occupations, there was a gap of ₹6,492 in the monthly wages of 
men and women in P&E occupations: of this, 88% (₹5,712) could be explained by employer bias with 
the remaining 12% (₹780) being due to differences in male female attributes.11   
 Similarly, in the clerical and in the sales/service occupations, the observed wage gaps 
between men and women were, respectively, ₹3,779 and ₹3,643.  Of these gaps, ₹3,270 and ₹2,178 
represented male-female differences in synthetic wages in, respectively, the clerical and in the 
sales/service occupations thus implying that employer bias accounted for, respectively, 87% and 60% 
of the male-female wage gaps in these two occupations.  
 
11
 Note that in this case, both B=₹6,769 and C=₹5,989 are positive. This means that both men and women in the 
P&E occupations had attributes that were superior to the collective of 54,702 persons in the estimation sample 
but the relative superiority of men was greater so that B-C=₹780>0. 
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  Agricultural and construction workers provided two interesting cases. In both occupations, 
ˆ 0M MB w w= −   and ˆ 0F FC w w= −  implying that men and women who were agricultural and 
construction workers had wage-determining attributes that were inferior to that of the collective 
sample of 54,702 persons. In the case of agriculture, B=-₹1,234 and C=-₹1,406 while, for 
construction, B=-₹1,766 and C=-₹1,483. However, in agriculture B-C=₹172>0 meaning that, relative 
to women agricultural workers, male agricultural workers had superior attributes so that 
δ=₹1,163/₹1,335=0.87%<1 and λ=₹172/₹1,335=0.13%<1: of the overall male-female wage gap of 
₹1,335 among agricultural workers, 87% was the result of employer bias and 13% was the result of 
employee attributes.  On the other hand, among construction workers, B-C=-₹283>0 meaning that, 
relative to male construction workers, female construction workers had superior attributes so that 
δ=₹1,512/₹1,229=1.23>1 and λ=-₹283/₹1,229=-0.23<0: of the overall male-female wage gap of 
₹1,229 among construction workers, 123% was the result of employer bias and -23% was the result of 
employee attributes. 
    In terms of employers, women faced employer bias in the public sector and in private firms 
and among private employers.  Of the ₹7,219 gap in male-female monthly wages in the public sector, 
₹4,590 (64%) was due to employer bias; employer bias accounted for 86% of the male-female 
monthly wages gap of ₹2,239 in jobs with private employers and 71% of the male-female monthly 
wages gap of ₹2,603 in jobs with private firms.  The case of NREG is particularly interesting. In jobs 
provided by NREG, over 90% of which were casual labour jobs, the male-female wage difference, at 
₹209 - resulting from a monthly wage of ₹3,392 for men and ₹3,183 for women - was negligible.   
6.6 Caste Disparity and Discrimination in Monthly Wages 
  In a manner analogous to that described above for gender differences, this section compares 
monthly wage differences between persons from the FC and the SC and quantifies the relative 
amounts of the observed difference that was due to employer bias and to differences in employee 
attributes.  As with the study of gender disparities, the first step towards answering this question lay in 
using IHDS-11 data to estimate a regression equation in which the monthly wages of persons (aged 
21-60 years), as the dependent variable, was explained by: (i) gender; (ii) education; (iii) fluency in 
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English; (iv) location; (v) type of contract; (vi) employer; (vii) occupation; (viii) age band; (ix) state 
of residence. These independent variables were defined in detail in the previous section.  
 The innovation about the wage equation estimated in this section was that each of these nine 
independent variables was interacted with a “caste” variable which took the value 1 if the person was 
from the SC and the value 0 if the person was from the FC.  Consequently, the interacted equation 
allowed the predicted wage for FC and SC persons to be different with respect to every one of the 
nine independent variables and, furthermore, it allowed one to test whether these differences were 
significantly different from zero. 
<Table 6.9> 
 Table 6.9 shows the results from estimating the wage equation, with caste interaction effects, 
on data for 24,043 persons from the IHDS-11, who were either from the SC or the FC and who were 
between the ages of 21 and 60 years. The results are presented in terms of the synthetic wages for SC 
and FC persons for the different variable categories.  The synthetic wages for the SC and FC, across 
all persons, were FCw =  ₹5,737 and SCw = ₹5,503, respectively. It should be emphasised that these 
wages were obtained by applying FC and SC coefficients, respectively, to the sample of 24,043 FC 
and SC persons and that they were different from the average FC and SC wages observed in the 
estimation sample, of, respectively, ˆ FCw =  ₹8,195 and ˆ SCw = ₹4,678.12  The difference in the FC and 
SC synthetic wage was ₹234 and dividing this difference by the standard error of 115 yielded a t-
value of 2.0 which, in turn, meant that this difference was significantly different from zero. In other 
words, employer bias ensured that SC persons, on average, were paid a monthly wage which was 
₹234 less than that paid to people from the FC. 
 The results from Table 6.9 showed that, on average, the synthetic male FC monthly wage was 
significantly higher than that of SC men (Table 6.9: ₹6,719 versus ₹5,991) but the synthetic female 
FC monthly wage was significantly lower than of SC women (Table 6.9: ₹3,451 versus ₹4,366).  In 
terms of education, it was only for graduates that there was a significant difference between the FC 
and SC average synthetic monthly wage (Table 6.9: ₹8,386 versus ₹7,002 for, respectively FC and SC 
 
12
 The latter were obtained by computing the average wage after applying, respectively, the FC coefficients to 
the FC subsample and the SC coefficients to the SC subsample.  
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graduates); for all other educational levels, the average synthetic monthly wages of FC and SC 
persons were not significantly different. Similarly, it was only for persons who claimed fluency in 
English that there was a significant difference between the FC and SC average synthetic monthly 
wage (Table 6.9: ₹10,249 versus ₹8,391 for, respectively the FC and SC); for all other fluency levels, 
the average synthetic monthly wages of FC and SC persons were not significantly different.  In terms 
of location, it was only for persons who lived in non-metro urban areas that there was a significant 
difference between the FC and SC average synthetic monthly wage (Table 6.9: ₹6,711 versus ₹6,054 
for, respectively the FC and SC); for all other locations, the average synthetic monthly wages of FC 
and SC persons were not significantly different.  
  In terms of job contracts, it was only for persons who had permanent jobs that there was a 
significant difference between the FC and SC average synthetic monthly wage (Table 6.9: ₹6,588 
versus ₹6,036 for, respectively the FC and SC); for all other contract types, the average synthetic 
monthly wages of FC and SC persons were not significantly different. In terms of employer, it was 
only for persons with jobs in the public sector that there was a significant difference between the FC 
and SC average synthetic monthly wage (Table 6.9: ₹11,450 versus ₹10,558 for, respectively the FC 
and SC); for all other employers, the average synthetic monthly wages of FC and SC persons were not 
significantly different.  
 In terms of occupation, it was only for persons who had P&E jobs or who were agricultural 
workers that there was a significant difference between the FC and SC average synthetic monthly 
wage (Table 6.9: ₹7,727 versus ₹6,193 for, respectively FC and SC in P& E jobs and ₹5,697 versus 
₹5,256 for, respectively FC and SC agricultural workers); indeed, in the clerical occupations, the 
average synthetic monthly wage of SC persons was significantly higher than of their FC counterparts 
(Table 6.9: ₹4,316 versus ₹5,368 for, respectively FC and SC in clerical jobs); for all other 
occupations, the average synthetic monthly wages of FC and SC persons were not significantly 
different. Lastly, in terms of age, the average synthetic monthly wage of SC persons in the lowest age 
band was significantly higher than of their FC counterparts (Table 6.9: ₹4,665 versus ₹5,158 for, 
respectively FC and SC in the 21-30 age band) but the average synthetic monthly wages of SC 
persons in the two highest age bands were significantly lower than of their FC counterparts (Table 
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6.9: ₹6,343 versus ₹5,648 for, respectively FC and SC in the 41-50 age band and ₹7,657 versus 
₹6,082 for, respectively FC and SC in the 51-60 age band). 
 Remembering that the average synthetic wage – by measuring the extent to which persons 
were rewarded or penalised simply because they happened to belong to a particular group (men 
rewarded for being men, women penalised for being women; persons rewarded for belonging to the 
FC and penalised for belonging to the SC) - reflects employer bias for or against certain groups, the 
results of Tables 6.7 and 6.9 show that while employer bias against women was general over the 
labour market in India, employer bias against persons from the SC was specific to certain 
circumstances: graduates, fluent in English, P&E occupations, non-metro urban locations.  Outside 
these circumstances there was no evidence of employer bias against persons from the SC.  
Quantifying Caste Discrimination in Wages 
 Using the methodology detailed in the previous section, the observed difference in wages 
between FC and SC persons can be decomposed as: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
CZ A B
FC SC FC SC FC FC SC SCw w w w w w w w
  − = − + − − −  
  (6.7) 
<Table 6.10> 
  Table 6.10 shows the results of quantifying the components of equation (6.7).  Of the 
observed wage gap of ₹3,517 in monthly wages between FC and SC persons, considered in their 
entirety, only ₹234 (or, less than 7%) could be explained by employer bias while the remainder was 
due to differences in attributes between the two groups. In terms of occupations, there was a gap of 
₹5,085 in the monthly wages of FC and SC persons in P&E occupations: of this, 30% (₹1,534) could 
be explained by employer bias with the remaining 70% being due to differences in attributes between 
the two groups.13  Similarly, in the sales/service occupations, there was a FC-SC gap in monthly 
wages of ₹1,568 of which only 20% (₹317) could be explained by employer bias, the remainder due 
to differences in attributes between the two groups. 
 
13
 Note that in this case, both B=₹8,021 and C=₹4,470 are positive. This means that both FC and SC persons in 
the P&E occupations had attributes that were superior to the collective 24,043 persons in the estimation sample 
but the relative superiority of FC persons was greater so that B-C=₹3,551>0. 
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 In the context of employers, there was a gap of ₹5,144 in the monthly wages of FC and SC 
persons in the public sector only 17% of which (₹891) could be explained by employer bias with the 
remaining 83% being due to differences in attributes between the two groups.14  For private employers 
and for private firms, employer bias explained less than 10% of observed monthly wage differences 
between their employees from the FC and the SC.  The overall conclusion from this analysis is that of 
the, admittedly, considerable gap in observed monthly earnings between persons from the FC and the 
SC, only a small portion could be attributed to employer bias with most of the gap being due to 
differences between persons from the two groups in their employee attributes.    
6.7 Conclusions 
 In a country as suffused with identity politics as India, engendered by a pathological 
consciousness of group membership, there is one group whose needs and ambitions, when they are 
not being actively thwarted, are often ignored. This group comprises India’s women, all of whom 
have the misfortune of living in a society infused with patriarchal mores.  The results of this chapter 
offer a vignette of gender disparities with respect to wages.  
 The wage gap between men and women in India is enormous: on NSS data, women’s wages 
were only 57% that of men while, on IHDS-11 data, this proportion was 54%.  This gap might be 
justified if it could be shown that men deserved higher wages because they had commensurately 
superior employment-related attributes than women. But that is not so. As the results of this chapter 
show, 74% of the overall wage gap between men and women was due to employer bias against 
women and only 26% of this gap could be explained by the superior attributes of male workers (Table 
6.8).  Moreover, this bias was all pervasive and affected all employers, all occupations, all levels of 
education, and all locations. No woman escaped the pernicious influence of employer bias which led 
to her being paid less than a man simply because she happened to be a woman. To the many faces of 
gender inequality catalogued by Sen (2001), add gender-based wage discrimination. 
 At the same time, the wage gap between persons from the FC and the SC was also large: on 
NSS data, SC wages were only 65% that of the FC while, on IHDS-11 data, this proportion was 54%.  
 
14
 Note that in this case, both B=₹5,564 and C=₹1,312 are positive. This means that both FC and SC persons in 
the public sector had attributes that were superior to the general sample but the relative superiority of FC 
persons was greater so that B-C=₹4,252>0. 
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This regrettable fact would be deplorable if it could be shown that a substantial part of this gap was 
explained by employer bias against persons from the SC. Indeed, the easy assumption that Indian 
employers display caste-based bias forms the basis of identity politics in India and underpins demands 
for the special treatment of those belonging to its “backward classes”. 
 As this chapter showed, on the evidence of wage data, there was very little evidence of 
employer bias influencing the wage gap between persons from the FC and the SC. Of the overall gap 
of ₹3,517 in monthly wages between FC and SC persons less than 7% could be explained by 
employer bias. The largest manifestation of such bias was with respect to P&E jobs in which 30% of 
the overall gap of ₹5,085 in monthly wages between FC and SC persons in such occupations could be 
explained by employer bias. So, the conclusion with respect to wages is not much different from 
conclusions with respect to employment outcomes. Employer bias or discrimination, call it what you 
will, does indeed exist against those in India who are from its “backward classes” but, compared to 
the role of the inferior attributes of the latter, relative to those from the “forward castes”, such bias is 
of a secondary order of importance in explaining differences in observed labour market outcomes 
between the “backward” and the “forward” classes.           
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Table 6.1 Average Daily Wages (₹) by Social Group, Gender, and Occupation* 
 All 
Occupations 
Regular 
Salaried/ 
Wage 
Employees 
Casual 
Labour 
Own 
Account 
workers 
All Persons 276 472 144 143 
Scheduled Tribe 187 427 114 128 
Scheduled Caste 200 361 143 145 
Other Backward Classes (Non-Muslim) 244 400 151 134 
Muslims 221 341 151 157 
Forward Castes 484 628 149 170 
Men 309 506 160 146 
Women 177 334 105 105 
*Figures pertain to a total of 46,468 persons aged 21-60 years. All the numbers have been grossed up using NSS provided 
weights. 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012)   
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Table 6.2: Average Monthly Wages (₹) by Social Group, Gender and Occupation* 
 All 
Occupations 
Professional 
& Executive 
Clerical Sales and 
Service 
Agricultural 
Labour 
Construction Other non-
Farm 
All Persons 5,539  15,075 11,969  5,948  3,471 4,144  6,454  
Scheduled Tribe 3,814  11,894  13,209  4,913  2,743  3,625  5,125  
Scheduled Caste 4,773  12,102  11,551  5,508  3,589  4,132 6,077  
Other Backward 
Classes (Non-
Muslim) 
5,323  14,141 10,726 5,645  3,498  4,159  6,736 
Muslims 5,294 13,388  11,166  5,461  3,460 4,518  5,259  
Forward Castes 8,896  17,216  13,166 7,416 4,152  4,461 7,868  
Men 6,518 17,227 12,692 7,488 4,089 4,535 7,143 
Women 3,531 10,210 8,089 3,206 2,716 3,295 2,995 
*Figures pertain to a total of 37,783 persons aged 21-60 years. All the numbers have been grossed up using IHDS-11 
provided weights. 
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-11. 
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Table 6.3 Inequality in Average Daily Wages by Social Group, Gender, and Occupation* 
 All Occupations Regular Salaried/ 
Wage Employees 
Casual Labour Own Account 
workers 
 Gini Welfare 
(₹) 
Gini Welfare
(₹) 
Gini Welfare
(₹) 
Gini Welfare
(₹) 
All Persons 0.498 139 0.477 247 0.267 106 0.260 105 
Scheduled Tribe 0.458 101 0.458 232 0.228 88 0.253 96 
Scheduled Caste 0.406 119 0.460 195 0.251 107 0.253 109 
Other Backward Classes (Non-Muslim) 0.450 134 0.444 223 0.280 109 0.230 103 
Muslims 0.416 129 0.456 186 0.259 112 0.278 113 
Forward Castes 0.528 228 0.475 330 0.281 107 0.301 119 
Men 0.481 160 0.454 276 0.257 119 0.261 108 
Women 0.487 91 0.559 148 0.218 82 0.183 86 
*Welfare is defined as (1 )W G=  − where µ is mean average weekly wage and G is the Gini value.  
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012)  
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Table 6.4: Inequality in Average Monthly Wages by Social Group, Gender and Occupation* 
 
 
All Occupations Professional & Executive Clerical Sales and Service Agricultural Labour Construction Other non-
Farm 
 Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
Gini W 
(₹) 
All Persons 0.424 3,190 0.466 8,047 0.383 7,385 0.490 3,033 0.262 2,559 0.234 3,175 0.391 3,930 
Scheduled Tribe 0.333 2,541 0.432 6,748 0.436 7,453 0.476 2,572 0.249 2,059 0.161 3,042 0.344 3,361 
Scheduled Caste 0.362 3,044 0.500 6,051 0.405 6,872 0.498 2,766 0.252 2,683 0.233 3,168 0.361 3,882 
Other Backward Classes (Non-Muslim) 0.404 3,171 0.472 7,464 0.378 6,664 0.476 2,957 0.258 2,594 0.242 3,154 0.389 4,111 
Muslims 0.404 3,154 0.510 6,568 0.406 6,629 0.474 2,872 0.258 2,567 0.224 3,503 0.389 3,213 
Forward Castes 0.485 4,586 0.436 9,702 0.358 8,448 0.491 3,776 0.274 3,013 0.270 3,260 0.403 4,704 
Men 0.412 3,834 0.429 9,831 0.357 8,158 0.418 4,357 0.259 3,029 0.247 3,416 0.359 4,576 
Women 0.357 2,270 0.524 4,857 0.495 4,081 0.535 1,491 0.206 2,155 0.153 2,790 0.418 1,743 
*Welfare (W) is defined as (1 )W G=  − where µ is mean average weekly wage and G is the Gini value. 
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-11. 
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  Table 6.5: Contribution of Between Group Inequality to Overall Inequality+ 
 Daily Wage* Monthly Wage** 
Division of Sample by → Gender Social Group Employment 
Status++ 
Gender Social Group Occupation 
Between Group 0.026 0.062 0.173 0.038 0.030 0.110 
Within Group 0.389 0.353 0.242 0.269 0.276 0.197 
Total Inequality 0.415 0.415 0.415 0.307 0.307 0.307 
Between Group as Percentage 
of Total Inequality 
6.3 14.9 41.7 12.4 9.8 35.8 
++
 Regular salaried and wage employment; casual wage employment; own account work. 
The decompositions were conducted for 46,462 and 37,778 persons (all between 21 and 60 years of age) for, respectively, the average weekly, and the average monthly, wage. 
Inequality is measured by Theil’s MLD index defined in equation (6.3) in the text. 
* Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) 
** Source: Own calculations from IHDS-11. 
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Table 6.6: The Equally Distributed Daily and Monthly Wage by Social Group and Gender 
 Daily Wage (NSS) (₹) Monthly Wage (IHDS-11) (₹) 
 ε=0 ε=1 ε=2 ε=0 ε=1 ε=2 
All Persons 276 182 136 5,539 4,077 3,045 
Scheduled Tribe 187 131 106 3,814 3,116 2,425 
Scheduled Caste 200 152 122 4,773 3,793 2,931 
Other Backward Classes (Non-Muslim) 244 175 137 5,323 4,036 3,130 
Muslims 221 166 133 5,294 3,956 2,880 
Forward Castes 484 291 187 8,896 5,903 3,934 
Men 309 210 159 6,518 4,917 3,870 
Women 177 118 94 3,531 2,776 2,119 
Source: Own calculations from NSS 68th round (July 2011-June 2012) and IHDS-11 
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Table 6.7: Differences between Men and Women in their Predicted Monthly Wage (₹)§ 
 
Male Wage Female Wage Difference SE tvalue 
All Persons 5864 3923 1941** 56 34.4 
Social Group      
Scheduled Tribe 5540 3831 1709** 104 16.5 
Scheduled Caste 5740 3963 1776** 74 24.2 
OBC NonMuslim  5881 3870 2011** 74 27.0 
Muslims 5730 3690 2039** 165 12.4 
Forward Castes [R] 6405 4192 2213** 157 14.1 
Education      
No education 5555 3565 1989** 82 24.2 
Primary or below 5658 3611 2047** 95 21.6 
Primary to Secondary 5826 3636 2190** 92 23.8 
Higher Secondary 5913 4811 1101** 326 3.4 
Graduate or above [R] 7992 6903 1089** 586 1.9 
English Competence      
None 5672 3548 2124** 68 31.1 
Little 5857 4236 1621** 189 8.6 
Fluent [R] 9012 8974 38 660 0.1 
Location      
Metro [R] 8865 6612 2254** 405 5.6 
Urban nonmetro 6673 4592 2081** 138 15.1 
More developed village 5444 3584 1860** 101 18.4 
Less developed village 5355 3465 1890** 86 22.0 
Contract      
Casual 5781 3887 1893** 66 28.6 
< 1 year 4736 3059 1677** 261 6.4 
Permanent [R] 6525 4296 2229** 205 10.9 
Employer      
Public sector [R] 11997 7407 4590** 399 11.5 
Private Employer 5542 3617 1925** 68 28.4 
Private Firm 5643 3788 1855** 115 16.1 
NREGA 4130 3376 755** 100 7.5 
Other 5717 3645 2072** 252 8.2 
Occupation      
Professional/Executive [R] 8792 3080 5713** 583 9.8 
Clerical 5440 2170 3270** 469 7.0 
Sales/Service 4395 2217 2179** 277 7.9 
Agricultural 5274 4111 1163** 96 12.2 
Construction 6285 4773 1512** 118 12.8 
Other nonfarm 5847 3598 2249** 149 15.1 
Age Band      
2130 [R] 5350 3594 1755** 73 23.9 
3140 5679 3845 1834** 80 22.9 
4150  6170 4156 2014** 86 23.5 
5160 6750 4344 2406** 128 18.8 
 §Estimated on data for 54,702 persons between the ages of 21 and 60 years. 2 0.48R =    
 **
 Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-2011 
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Table 6.8: Measuring Gender Discrimination in the Monthly Wage for Persons Aged 21-60 years  
 
ˆ ˆM Wp p−   M Wp p−  ˆ M Mp p−  ˆW Wp p−  
All persons 2,593 1,941 246 -406 
Employer     
Public Sector 
Employer 
7,219 4,590 3,892 1,263 
Private Employer 2,239 1,925 -349 -663 
Private Firm 2,603 1,855 582 -166 
NREGA 209 755 -738 -192 
Occupation     
Professional/Executive 6,492 5,712 6,769 5,989 
Clerical 3,779 3,270 5,962 5,453 
Sales/Service 3,643 2,178 2,503 1,038 
Agricultural Workers 1,335 1,163 -1,234 -1,406 
Construction Workers 1,229 1,512 -1,766 -1,483 
Other non-farm 3,555 2,249 688 -618 
Note: Discrimination is measured vis-à-vis men  
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-2011 
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Table 6.9: Differences between Scheduled Caste (SC) and Forward Caste (FC) Persons in their 
Predicted Monthly Wage (₹)§ 
 
FC Wage SC Wage Difference SE t-value 
All Persons        5,737         5,503            234**          115  2.0 
Gender      
Men        6,719         5,991            728**          127  5.8 
Women        3,451         4,366  -915**          196  -4.7 
Education      
No education        5,427         5,305            122          173  0.7 
Primary or below        5,234         5,275  -41          174  -0.2 
Primary to Secondary        5,445         5,380              65          166  0.4 
Higher Secondary        6,051         5,463            589          337  1.7 
Graduate or above [R]        8,386         7,002         1,384**          511  2.7 
English Competence      
None        5,294         5,248              47          123  0.4 
Little        5,985         5,546            439          234  1.9 
Fluent [R]      10,249         8,391         1,858**          738  2.5 
Location      
Metro [R]        9,011         8,244            768          549  1.4 
Urban non-metro        6,711         6,054            657**          266  2.5 
More developed village        5,330         5,061            269          220  1.2 
Less developed village        4,871         4,994  -123          202  -0.6 
Contract      
Casual        5,577         5,432            145          140  1.0 
< 1 year        4,683         4,353            330          387  0.9 
Permanent [R]        6,588         6,036            551          307  1.8 
Employer      
Public sector [R]      11,450       10,558            891**          459  1.9 
Private Employer        5,201         5,068            134          149  0.9 
Private Firm        5,508         5,220            288          226  1.3 
NREGA        4,184         4,036            148          235  0.6 
Other        4,752         5,278  -526          547  -1.0 
Occupation      
Professional/Executive [R]        7,727         6,193         1,534**          614  2.5 
Clerical        4,316         5,368  -1,052**          468  -2.3 
Sales/Service        3,989         3,673            317          364  0.9 
Agricultural        5,697         5,256            441**          188  2.3 
Construction        6,129         6,084              46          169  0.3 
Other non-farm        5,576         5,496              80          236  0.3 
Age Band      
21-30 [R]        4,665         5,158  -493**          178  -2.8 
31-40        5,311         5,427  -116          222  -0.5 
41-50         6,343         5,648            695 **         175  4.0 
51-60        7,657         6,082         1,574**          271  5.8 
 §Estimated on data for 24,043 persons between the ages of 21 and 60 years. 2 0.49R =    
 **
 Significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-2011 
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Table 6.10: Measuring Caste Discrimination in the Monthly Wages: SC and FC persons Aged 21-60 
Years  
 
ˆ ˆFC SCp p−   FC SCp p−  ˆ FC FCp p−  ˆ SC SCp p−  
All persons 3,517 234 2,458 -825 
Employer     
Public Sector 
Employer 
5,144 891 5,564 1,312 
Private Employer 1,735 134 822 -780 
Private Firm 3,170 288 2,443 -439 
NREGA -51 148 -945 -746 
Occupation     
Professional/Executive 5,085 1,534 8,021 4,470 
Clerical 1,642 -1,052 7,459 4,765 
Sales/Service 1,568 317 2,966 1,714 
Agricultural Workers 473 441 -1,649 -1,681 
Construction Workers 249 46 -1,697 -1,901 
Other non-farm 1,597 80 1,621 103 
Note: Discrimination is measured vis-à-vis persons from the Forward Castes  
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-2011 
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Figure 6.1 
The Equally Distributed Equivalent Wage 
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     Figure 2: The Curvature of the Indifference Curves and the value of  
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